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INTRODUCTION
With the current climate of ever-escalating salaries for
professional athletes in the major sports, especially in the
National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball
Association (NBA),1 athlete’s agents are increasingly willing
to bend or break National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) rules to sign the next big star. As a result, the NCAA
has resorted to increasingly harsh penalties for schools where
violations occur. Examples of this can be found at the
University of Alabama (“Alabama”) in the 1990s and early
2000s as well as at the University of Southern California
(“USC”) in 2010. Due to Alabama’s rules violations in 2002,
the NCAA placed Alabama’s football program on probation,
required it to reduce its number of scholarships, and
prohibited it from playing in bowl games for two years.2
These penalties made Alabama’s football program less
competitive for years and cost Alabama arguably millions of
dollars in lost ticket sales, goodwill and alumni donations,
and advertising and television revenue. Similar consequences
are being projected for the football program at USC.3 With
* For a look at escalation of median salaries in both the NFL and NBA, as well as in
Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League, one can consult the USA
Today Salary Database. USA Today Salaries Databases, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2010,
8:56 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/salaries/default.aspx; USA
Today
Salaries
Databases, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2010, 8:55
PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/salaries/default.aspx?Loc=Vanity.
For
instance, in 2000 the highest median team salary in the NFL was the Detroit Lions’
$619,050 while the highest median team salary in the NFL in 2009 was the San
Francisco 49ers’ $1,325,000.
2. John Zenor, NCAA rolls Crimson Tide for Violations, USA Today, Feb. 1, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2002-02-01-alabama-violations.htm
3. See Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Sports Receive Harsh Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/sports/ncaafootball/11usc.html (discussing
the NCAA violations and noting that the resulting penalties will be a significant
setback); Zach Rosenfield, Impact of USC’s NCAA Violations, ACCUSCORE, June 10,
2010, http://accuscore.com/impact-of-uscs-ncaa-violations (asserting the real effect of
the penalties comes from the loss of scholarships and will not be felt until after the
post-season ban is lifted). Interestingly, USC is taking advantage of a loophole to
postpone the effects of the NCAA’s sanctions. See Stewart Mandel, Kiffin skirting
recruiting sanctions as USC continues appeals process, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 28,
2011, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/stewart_mandel/01/24/usc.recruiting
/index.html. If a school appeals its penalties, they are stayed while the appeal is
ongoing. Id. Thus, since USC appealed the NCAA’s sanctions and had not received a
decision by the national signing day, USC was able to ignore the scholarship reduction
and sign a full class of student-athletes. Id. If USC’s appeal is denied, the full penalties
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such severe penalties, one would expect schools to crack down
on violations by agents and athletes, but high-profile
violations continue to occur.4
There have been calls for more regulation of the agent
industry,5 action from the professional players’ unions barring
violating agents from representing members,6 and even an
end to amateur status for NCAA athletes,7 but, while all of
those solutions may work in theory, the adoption and
implementation of any of them is completely impractical.
Rather, the tools for preventing such conduct have already
been placed in the hands of the affected schools, waiting for a
chance to be used. With the passage of the Uniform Athlete
Agent Act (“UAAA”) at the state level and the Sports Agent
Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”) at the federal level,
a school can bring a civil suit against any agents who cause it
damage.8
Accordingly, this Comment will argue that to prevent
future NCAA rule violations by agents, schools should bring a
civil suit against any agent that causes the school damage.
Part I of this Comment will look at the current climate
surrounding amateur athlete-agent relations including
overviews of the NCAA, the sports agent industry, and early
cases and legislation. Special emphasis will be placed on the
passage and contents of the UAAA and SPARTA. Part II will
will be applied from the date of the decision going forward. Id.
4. See Jim Calhoun to be suspended in 2011-12, ESPN, Feb. 23, 2011,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=6146656 (discussing the rules violations at
the University of Connecticut and the subsequent penalization of its men’s basketball
program).
5. See Eric Willenbacher, Note, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal
And State Efforts Do Not Deter The Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent And How A National
Licensing System May Cure The Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225 (2004) (asserting
that regulation of a new national licensing system would prevent agents from violating
NCAA rules).
6. See Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781 (2006) (discussing players
associations regulations and powers to sanction agents as possible ways to deter agents
from violating NCAA rules)
7. Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, The History Behind Athlete Agent Regulation And
The “Slam Dunking of Statutory Hurdles”, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67 (2001)
(proposing that the NCAA’s insistence on preserving amateur status may no longer be
realistic or desirable).
8. UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16 (2000); Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7805 (2004).
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then consider previously proffered solutions, specifically, calls
for more regulation, eliminating the amateur status
requirement, and the intervention by professional players’
unions.
After considering these previously proffered
solutions, Part III will assert that the best solution to the
problem is civil suits brought by the harmed schools against
the violating agents. This section will consider both statutory
and common law actions that schools may bring as well as
address potential concerns and the viability of this solution.
Part IV will then discuss other parties who may have claims
against violating agents, which may serve as a supplement to
any claims that schools may bring. Part V concludes the
Comment.
BACKGROUND OF AMATEUR ATHLETE-AGENT RELATIONS
Amateur athlete-agent relations are complex in that they
affect numerous parties outside the immediate relationship.
Not only do you have the athlete and the agent involved, but
you also have the NCAA, the agent industry, legislators, and
even the courts as part of the complete picture. Thus, in order
to gain a full understanding of amateur athlete-agent
relations, one needs to understand each party’s role.
The NCAA
The NCAA was founded in 1906 due to concerns over
dangerous athletic practices, particularly those in football.9
After decades of success and expansion, in 1973, the NCAA
divided into its present three-division format and, in 1980, the
NCAA began overseeing women’s collegiate sports.10 Because
of its continued expansion and the increased difficulties it had
to contend with, the NCAA began establishing commissions
starting with the President’s Commission in 1984.11
Presidents from schools belonging to the NCAA’s three
divisions compose these commissions and develop solutions to
9. History, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Sept. 17, 2010,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+
the+ncaa+history.
10. Id.
11. Id. The President’s Commission was charged with setting the NCAA’s agenda
and was composed of university presidents from each of the three divisions. Id.
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unique and specific problems confronting the NCAA.12 Also
introduced by the NCAA in 1984, the Professional Sports
Counseling Panel was created to provide student athletes
with competent advice regarding their futures without
putting their amateur status at risk.13 But, this panel never
became widely used.14
The development of the Professional Sports Counseling
Panel at such an early stage of the NCAA’s development of
commissions highlights the significance the NCAA places on
keeping collegiate athletics separate from professional sports.
The principle of amateurism is addressed in article two of the
NCAA constitution:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.15

Article 12 of the NCAA Division I Manual provides further
guidance on the principle of amateurism.16 Only amateur
athletes are allowed to participate in intercollegiate athletics
and athletic programs are designed to be part of educational
programs.17 In addition to an athlete being automatically
ineligible if they ever compete on a professional team, athletes
become ineligible if they agree to be represented by an agent,
even if the retention of the agent is for future negotiations.18
Further, athletes will be deemed ineligible if they, their
relatives, or their friends ever accept transportation or
benefits from an agent.19
12. One such commission, the Knight Commission, issued a report in 2010
addressing fiscal transparency and academic accountability. See Gary Brown, NCAA
backs Knight Commission’s reform principles, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, June 17, 2010, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/NCAA+News/NCAA+News+Online/2010/Associatio
n-wide/NCAA+backs+Knight+Commissions+reform+principles+NCAA+News.
13. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 10.14[2][b] (2009)
[hereinafter Bender].
14. Id.
15. NCAA CONST. art. II
16. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL 65-80 (AUG. 1, 2010).
17. Id. at 65.
18. Id. at 71, 73.
19. Id.
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The Sports Agent Industry
The nature of the sports agent industry, where the priority
is to gain high-profile clients at any cost, is also a primary
cause of the problems addressed in this Comment. The public
perception of the sports agent market is that it is
overcrowded, and that is certainly true. One reason for the
surplus of agents is that it is so easy to become one. Former
agent, Josh Luchs (“Luchs”), has said that all it took to
become an NFL agent in 1988 was filling out some paperwork
and paying a registration fee of approximately three hundred
dollars.20 While some substance has been added to those
requirements, one would still certainly not classify them as
onerous. The current requirements to become an agent
registered with the NFL Players Association are (1) an
application fee of $1,650, (2) undergraduate and post
graduate degrees,21 (3) a background check, (4) attendance at
a two day seminar, (5) completion of a proctored examination,
and (6) a valid email address.22 One is able to begin
representing players upon passage of the examination and the
purchase of liability insurance.23
As a result of the ease with which one can become an
agent and the consequential market overcrowding, agents’
competition for clients has become fierce, with some willing to
go to any lengths to gain a client. Often, the agents act in
contravention of NCAA rules by paying athletes or providing
them with other benefits in order to entice them to sign an
agent agreement.24 Corey Sawyer, a former football player at
Florida State University (“Florida State”), confirmed this
assertion, admitting to going on an agent-funded shopping
spree at Foot Locker while still playing at Florida State.25
20. George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 12,
2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html?eref=sihp.
21. The postgraduate degree can be either a master’s or law degree. Agent
Regulations, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/Rules—
Regulations/Agent-Regulations/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
22. Id.
23. Agent
Certification
FAQs,
NFL
PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/FAQs/Agent-Certification-FAQs/ (last visited Oct.
27, 2010).
24. Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1229-32.
25. Sonja Steptoe & E.M. Smith, Anatomy Of A Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
May 16, 1994, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1005183/
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Luchs also confirmed the assertion and admitted to paying
players as a way to establish a client list and break into the
industry.26
Luchs’ method of paying players consisted of giving
players small monthly payments, instead of large lump sums,
in order to make the player stay in contact with him.27 The
use of this method partly explains why many schools and
coaches have a hard time determining if a player is being paid
by or receiving benefits from an agent. If a player showed up
to practice in a brand new Mercedes Benz, the coach would
suspect something, but if a player is receiving enough to buy
video games and pizza on the weekends, there is likely no way
for someone to discover wrongdoing. Thus, the current sports
agent market can best be classified as overcrowded, fiercely
competitive, and filled with people who know how to bend and
break the rules without being detected.
Making matters worse, there is an attitude of disdain
toward the NCAA among some, if not most, sports agents. As
former agent, Mike Trope, once said:
The NCAA rules are not the laws of the United States. They're
simply a bunch of hypocritical and unworkable rules set up by the
NCAA. As an agent, I absolutely was not bound by them. NCAA
rules are meaningless. The coaches themselves, the people who are
supposed to be bound by them, don't abide by them either. Hell,
nobody follows the NCAA rules.28

Thus, because of the lack of any real sanction mechanism
and the seeming lack of respect by agents, any further
attempt by the NCAA to regulate the sports agent industry
would likely be similarly unsuccessful, necessitating action to
be taken by other parties.
index.htm. In addition to attending the shopping spree at Footlocker with at least six
of his teammates, Sawyer and at least five other Florida State football players accepted
cash and other benefits totaling nearly $60,000 from Raul Bey and his “bird dog” Nate
Cebrun. Id. Eventually, Bey and Cebrun were found guilty of failing to register with
Florida as sports agents. See Jack McCallum & Richard O’Brien, Scorecard July 15,
1996, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 15, 1996, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/
article/magazine/MAG1008373/index.htm. Bey was fined $12,000 and sentenced to one
year in jail while Cebrun was fined $2,000 and sentenced to thirty days in jail. Id. For
its part in the scandal, the NCAA placed Florida State on probation for one year for
failing to monitor the activities of agents. Id.
26. Dohrmann, supra note 20.
27. Id.
28. Bender, supra note 13, § 10.14[2][d].
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Early Cases Against Sports Agents
Due to the nature of the sports agent industry causing
unscrupulous agents to break NCAA rules to sign athletes,
the NCAA was forced to penalize the athletes and schools that
played a part in the violations. Because the schools and
athletes had no real recourse at that time, prosecutors
attempted to deter future incidents by going after some such
agents.29 This was the motivation behind such cases as
Abernathy v. State (“Abernathy”),30 United States v. Walters
(“Walters”),31 and United States v. Piggie (“Piggie”).32 But, the
legal frameworks under which these cases were argued were
ill-suited towards prohibiting the targeted behavior.
Criminal Cases
In Abernathy,33 a former sports agent entered into a
contract with a college football player who continued to play
for the university in violation of NCAA rules. The agent was
charged under Alabama law with commercial bribery,
unlawful trade practice, and tampering with a sports contest.
After trial, a jury acquitted him of the first two charges,
which were poor fits because entering into a contract with an
athlete is not illegal. But, the jury found him guilty of
tampering with a sports contest and Abernathy was
sentenced to one year of imprisonment and fined $2,000.34 On
appeal, the court reversed the conviction, finding that
Abernathy did not possess the requisite intent.35 The court
stated that a conviction for tampering with a sports contest
required the intent to influence the outcome.36 The court
found that Abernathy’s intent, at worst, was for Auburn to
play with an ineligible player and, thus, Abernathy did not
29. Prosecutors had an interest in these early cases against agents because most of
the schools affected by the NCAA sanctions were state institutions such as Auburn
University; the University of California, Los Angeles; the University of Missouri; and
Oklahoma State University.
30. Abernathy v. State, 545 So.2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
31. United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
32. United States v. Piggie, 303 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2002).
33. Abernathy, 545 So.2d at 186.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 191.
36. Id. at 188.
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have criminal intent and the conviction warranted reversal.37
Beyond this reason, however, the court determined, “The
fundamental reason why Abernethy's conviction must be
reversed is because the crime of tampering with a sports
contest was obviously not intended to and does not, embrace
the agent contract type of situation involved in this case.”38
The court gives the impression that this law is also not a good
fit for situations involving typical agent agreements.39
Similarly, in Walters,40 an agent provided student-athletes
with money and cars in exchange for their signing a
representation agreement with him, which he post-dated and
promised to keep secret until the athletes’ collegiate careers
were over. But, when it came time for the athletes to acquire
agents, many signed with other agents and kept the money
and cars from Walters.41 After becoming frustrated, Walters
threatened to break one of the athlete’s legs unless the athlete
repaid Walters’ firm and federal prosecutors charged him
with conspiracy, RICO violations for extortion, and mail
fraud.42 Walters agreed to enter a conditional Alford plea,
preserving his right to contest the sufficiency of the evidence
against him, and plead guilty to mail fraud while the
prosecutor dismissed the conspiracy and RICO charges.43 The
prosecutor argued that Walters was guilty of mail fraud
because his scheme defrauded the schools of property, the
37. Id.
38. Id. at 190.
39. As an interesting side note, the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of
1987 came into effect the same day Abernathy entered into the agreement with the
student-athlete. Abernathy, 545 So.2d at 190. But, that act did not prohibit or make
illegal entering into a sports contract with a student-athlete and prosecutors did not
charge Abernathy under it. Id. The court did not consider whether Abernathy violated
any provision of that act, but the prosecution’s failure to bring any charge under it may
indicate that entering into a sports contract with a student-athlete was actually not
prohibited under it.
40. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219. For an excellent discussion of Walters, see generally
Landis Cox, Note, Targeting Sports Agents With The Mail Fraud Statute: United States
v. Norby Walters & Lloyd Bloom, 41 DUKE L.J. 1157 (April 1992). The note provides an
in-depth examination of the trial, focusing on the four major parties relevant to the
case: the agents, the student-athletes, the school, and the NCAA. Id. at 1160-90. The
note also looks at how the mail fraud statute was stretched to its limits by the
government’s theory and provides policy considerations weighing against application of
the statute. Id. at 1190-1209.
41. Walters, 997 F.2d at 1221.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1221-22.
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scholarships wrongfully given to the ineligible athletes, through use of the mail, since the schools mailed falsified
eligibility forms to the NCAA.44 The court disagreed with the
prosecution because the use of the mail was not foreseeable by
Walters and he had not sought to obtain property from the
schools, only from the athletes in the future.45 Accordingly,
the court held that “only a scheme to obtain money or other
property from the victim by fraud,” would sustain a conviction
for mail fraud.46 Once again, the courts were unwilling to
stretch existing statutes to cover this type of agent behavior.
Conversely, in Piggie,47 the Eighth Circuit found that the
federal mail and wire fraud statute was applicable. There,
defendant Piggie ran a traveling Amateur American Union
(“AAU”) basketball team and devised a scheme to attract top
high school players to his team by paying them.48 Four of the
athletes Piggie paid committed to play college basketball at
various schools and used the U.S. Postal Service to deliver
their signed letters of intent, which falsely asserted their
eligibility. When Piggie’s payments to the athletes were
discovered, the NCAA penalized all the athletes, their
colleges, and their high schools.49 Consequently, Piggie plead
guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and was
sentenced to thirty-seven months in jail, three years of
supervised release, and ordered to pay $324,279.87 in
restitution.50 The court affirmed that Piggie’s scheme fell
within the definition of mail and wire fraud because his
actions deprived the schools of the services of the athletes,
caused the schools loss of scholarships due to NCAA penalties,
and forced the school to incur investigative and other costs.51
But, the court made no mention of the use of the mail to
perpetrate the fraud other than to state that the athletes
mailed their letters of intent.52 The majority of the court’s
opinion was focused on an analysis of the appropriate amount
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1223-24.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Piggie, 303 F.3d 923.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 924-26.
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 925.
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of damages, which was ultimately determined to be the
greater of actual or intended losses.53 This decision’s conflict
with that reached in Walters exhibits the major concern with
states’ regulation of agent behavior at that time: the lack of
uniformity between jurisdictions. It was this unpredictability
that eventually led to the UAAA’s promulgation.
Civil Cases
Actions against agents were not limited to the criminal
law, but aggrieved parties did not bring many civil actions.
Further, those that were initiated were settled without much
publicity, eliminating any deterrent effect the litigation might
have possessed. An example of this is an action brought by
USC against lawyer-agent, Robert Caron (“Caron”). In 1995,
Caron paid money and gave airline tickets and other items to
three USC football players.54
The NCAA began an
investigation into the transactions and USC decided to bring
suit against Caron. The suit alleged interference with
contractual
relationships
and
prospective
business
advantages.55 Before the case was litigated, however, Caron
settled with USC, agreeing to pay $50,000.56 While this may
not have been the first case where a school brought a civil
action against an agent, the NCAA director of enforcement at
that time, David Berst, did not believe such a suit had
occurred before.57 Thus, the success in this case should have
really started a trend for civil litigation as a solution to agent
misconduct, but perhaps the lack of publicity that a trial
would have generated prevented such a trend from starting.
The UAAA
In response to the concerns over jurisdictional uniformity
as well as the need for significant reform of sports agent
regulation, the National Conference of Commissioners on
53. Piggie, 303 F.3d at 927.
54. Elliott Almond, USC Will File Suit Against Agent Caron, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-06/sports/sp-53971_1_sports-agent.
55. Id.
56. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 429 n. v (West ed.,
3d ed. 2004).
57. Almond, supra note 54.
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Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) developed the UAAA in
2000.58 The NCCUSL’s purpose for the UAAA states:
This act provides for the uniform registration, certification, and
background check of sports agents seeking to represent student
athletes who are or may be eligible to participate in intercollegiate
sports. The act also imposes specified contract terms on these
agreements to the benefit of student athletes, and provides
educations institutions with a right to notice along with a civil
cause of action for damages resulting from a breach of specified
duties.59

The UAAA has been adopted by forty states as well as the
District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.60
A major focus of the UAAA is sports agent registration.
Under the UAAA, individuals may not act as agents unless
they have registered with the appropriate state and if any
person enters into an agent contract without being registered,
that contract is void and any consideration received under it
The UAAA also provides the
must be returned.61
requirements to register as an agent,62 factors states may
consider when deciding to approve a registration
application,63 and the process for suspension or revocation of
an individual’s registration.64 Further, the UAAA provides
language that must be included in an agent contract,65
requires notice of agent contracts to educational institutions,66
and permits student athletes to cancel any agent contract
within fourteen days of signing it.67 But, while all of the
provisions mentioned to this point are significant, and
necessary, the most important provisions of the UAAA

58. A Few Facts About the Uniform Athlete Agent Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aaa.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
59. Id.
60. Id.; Athlete Agents Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last
visited Oct. 28, 2010).
61. UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 4.
62. Id. § 5.
63. Id. § 6.
64. Id. § 7.
65. Id. § 10.
66. Id. § 11.
67. UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 12.
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provide a comprehensive list of prohibited conduct,68 criminal
Significantly, the civil
penalties,69 and civil remedies.70
remedies recoverable by a school may include “lost television
revenues, lost ticket sales from regular season athletic events,
lost revenues from not qualifying for postseason athletic
events such as football bowl games and NCAA tournaments,
and possibly the value of the athlete’s scholarship.”71
SPARTA
After the promulgation of the UAAA and the realization
that existing federal law was insufficient to control agent
misconduct, Congress passed SPARTA, which became law in
2004.72 SPARTA is intended, “to designate certain conduct by
sports agents relating to the signing of contracts with student
athletes as unfair and deceptive acts or practices to be
regulated by the Federal Trade Commission.”73 It is not
intended to displace state laws, but rather, to supplement
them.74 But, in SPARTA, Congress encourages states to adopt
the UAAA as it was promulgated by the NCCUSL in 2000,75
further demonstrating the concern for jurisdictional
uniformity.
68. Id. § 14. “An athlete agent, with the intent to induce a student-athlete to enter
into an agency contract, may not: (1) give any materially false or misleading
information or make a materially false promise or representation; (2) furnish anything
of value to a student-athlete before the student-athlete enters into the agency contract;
or (3) furnish anything of value to any individual other than the student-athlete or
another registered athlete agent.” Id. § 14(a)(1)-(3). “An athlete agent may not
intentionally: (1) initiate contact with a student-athlete unless registered under this
[Act]; (2) refuse or fail to retain or permit inspection of the records required to be
retained by Section 13; (3) fail to register when required by Section 4; (4) provide
materially false or misleading information in an application for registration or renewal
of registration; (5) predate or postdate an agency contract; or (6) fail to notify a studentathlete before the student-athlete signs or otherwise authenticates an agency contract
for a particular sport that the signing or authentication may make the student-athlete
ineligible to participate as a student-athlete in that sport.” Id. § 14(b)(1)-(6).
69. Id. § 15.
70. Id. § 16.
71. Weiler, supra note 56, at 429.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 7805; H.R. 361: Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-361 (last visited Oct.
28, 2010).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 7805.
74. Id. § 7806.
75. Id. § 7807.
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Unlike the UAAA, SPARTA does not focus on sports agent
registration. SPARTA starts by providing the prohibited
conduct and what the agent is required to disclose to the
athlete.76 SPARTA next states that any violation will be
treated as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
giving the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) the power to
enforce it.77 SPARTA goes on to give state attorneys general
the power to bring a civil action against any agent who causes
harm to residents by violating SPARTA and to provide for the
protection of the schools.78 While SPARTA has been criticized
for not providing a stronger deterrent than already existed
under federal law,79 this view overlooks the messages
Congress sent through SPARTA. First, Congress makes clear
that this type of agent behavior is completely unacceptable, is
taken seriously by the government, and will no longer be
tolerated. Second, Congress has sent a message to the FTC
and state attorneys general that violations of SPARTA should
not be overlooked and action should be taken whenever such
violations occur. Finally, Congress has made clear that, even
if the FTC or attorneys general do not bring an action,
whether for lack of resources or otherwise, violations of this
act should not go unpunished and those harmed the most, the
schools, should protect themselves through civil litigation.
PREVIOUSLY PROFFERED SOLUTIONS
Agents disregarding and breaking NCAA rules is not a
new phenomenon,80 even if it does seem to get much more
76. Id. § 7802.
77. Id. § 7803.
78. Id. §§ 7804, 7805. SPARTA provides for the protection of schools in two ways.
First, agents are required to provide written notice to the person responsible for the
school’s athletic programs within seventy two hours of entering into the contract or
before the next sporting event, whichever comes first. Id. § 7805(a). Second, schools
have a right of action against agents for damages caused by violations of SPARTA. Id. §
7805(b)(1). Damages include actual losses sustained by schools due to a violation of
SPARTA as well as those caused by penalties from the NCAA, conferences, or the
institution itself. Id. § 7805(b)(2). Significantly, prevailing schools may recover costs
and attorneys’ fees and schools’ rights, remedies, and defenses under law or equity are
not restricted by SPARTA. Id. §§ 7805 (b)(3), (4).
79. Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1235.
80. See Patrick Hruby, College football, agents go way back, ESPN, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?id=5710346. Hruby discusses
two individuals, future NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle and the future owner of the
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media coverage than in the past. As a result, the NCAA and
many others have tried to devise ways to force agents to
comply with NCAA rules. While, clearly, none have been
entirely successful to this point, these ideas have laid the
foundation for current legislation, like the UAAA and
SPARTA, to put us within reach of an ultimate solution. This
section will explore three main solutions that have been
offered as a way to reach that end point, but would ultimately
be unsuccessful for various reasons.
More Regulation of the Sports Agent Industry
Despite the fairly recent passage of the UAAA in most
states and SPARTA at the federal level, some individuals feel
that more regulation is needed to solve the problem of agents
breaking NCAA rules.81 Some call for regulation in the form
of a national licensing or registration program for agents,82
while others call for a requirement that agents possess a law
degree, thus allowing the Bar to police this type of conduct.83
Legislators in some states have also endorsed this solution.84
To truly consider this option, however, one needs to look at
the nature and enforcement of current regulations.
Of the forty-two states that have passed sports agent laws,
Tennessee Titans, Bud Adams, inducing Heisman Trophy winner Billy Cannon to sign
contracts with them by providing him with unbelievable gifts. Rozelle paid Cannon
$10,500 to sign with him while Adams paid Cannon $20,000, gave him ownership of
five gas stations, a half-interest in an oil company, and a Cadillac for his father. Id.
While Rozelle and Adams were not agents, they still acted in contravention of NCAA
rules, demonstrating that this type of behavior has existed for longer than many would
imagine.
81. See Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1249-53; Oregon legislation would crack
down on sports agents’ influence on college athletes, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 13, 2010,
http://www.oregonlive.com/collegefootball/index.ssf/2010/10/oregon_legislation_would_c
rack.html.
82. Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1249-53.
83. Stacey M. Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by a LawyerRepresentative Than An Agent? Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 431 (1999).
84. See Oregon legislation would crack down on sports agents’ influence on college
athletes, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/collegefootball/
index.ssf/2010/10/oregon_legislation_would_crack.html. Oregon has passed the UAAA,
but Senator Courtney will propose to strengthen the statute by broadening the
definition of sports agent, requiring agents to register with an official at each school
they intend to contact student-athletes, protect athletes at elementary and high
schools, and add a prohibition of providing benefits to athletes through friends or
family. Id.
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more than half have yet to invoke penalties of any sort on
violating agents.85 Further, the FTC has received very few
complaints about agents violating SPARTA and has not yet
taken any enforcement actions.86
There are numerous
reasons for this, but the primary ones seem to be a lack of
resources,87 lack of priority by enforcement agencies,88 and a
general belief that any actions will be useless as agents may
simply move their activities to a different state.89 While the
relative merits of these reasons may be questionable, their
existence is not and there is no reason to believe that passing
more regulations would eliminate them. More regulations
would not increase the amount of resources enforcement
agencies are able to dedicate to pursuing actions against
violating agents and would certainly not change the beliefs of
those responsible for enforcing the laws.
A more reasonable solution may be to simply tweak the
existing statutes, such as adding a national sports agent
registry requirement to SPARTA.90 But, even this solution
overlooks the problems with SPARTA as it now exists. The
addition of a national sports agent registry requirement
would not provide additional motivation to schools to report
agents who violate SPARTA and would not increase the FTC’s
ability or motivation to pursue actions against such agents.
Schools, athletes, and agents know who the violating agents
are, yet there have been very few complaints to the FTC and
it has taken no enforcement actions.91 Further, identifying
the violating agents will serve no purpose and will not deter
agents from engaging in improper conduct.

85. Alan Scher Zagier, Laws On Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/laws-on-sports-agentsrar_n_685000.html.
86. Id.
87. Liz Proctor, spokeswoman for the North Carolina Secretary of State’s office,
stated that when the UAAA was passed it came with no funding, so there were no
resources dedicated for its enforcement. Id.
88. As an example, Kenneth Shropshire, director of the Wharton Sports Business
Initiative at the University of Pennsylvania’s business school, has said, “If you’ve got
bank robbers and rapists, white-collar crime – how many agent issues should be raised
to the top of some prosecutor’s desk?” Id.
89. Id.
90. Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1249-53.
91. Zagier, supra note 85.
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NCAA Elimination of its Amateurism Requirement
The NCAA has received a lot of criticism for the
preservation of its amateurism requirement in an era where
its operating revenue equals $710 million.92 A particularly
critical analysis of the NCAA’s stance on amateurism states
that but for NCAA rules, an agent entering into a contract
with a student-athlete for their future representation would
not cause harm to the athlete or school.93 Also, the NCAA
rules place states in a no-win situation where they have to sit
by and allow athletes and schools to suffer harsh penalties or
punish the agents who cause such penalties to occur.94
Further, while the NCAA requires amateurism in an attempt
to secure the integrity of competition, its integrity has already
been compromised by the inherent unfairness of athletic
rankings and recruiting.95 Lastly, the NCAA rules permit
schools and coaches to take advantage of the student-athletes
by parlaying the student-athlete’s successes into larger
coaching contracts and increased financial resources for the
schools.96
But, aside from the extremely remote chance of the NCAA
eliminating its amateurism requirement making this solution
impractical, there are also valid responses to the criticisms.
In response to the assertion that student-athletes should be
paid because schools are generating revenues and the
student-athletes are doing the work, the NCAA emphasizes
that the revenues do not go to owners or shareholders, but to
providing increased opportunities for all student-athletes.97
Further, student-athletes are not university employees, but
are among the fortunate few that are able to continue their

92. Revised Budget for Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2010, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
6d3874004e51aadc96e0d622cf56f2f3/2009-10+Budget+Breakdown_ALL.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES&CACHEID=6d3874004e51aadc96e0d622cf56f2f3.
93. Sudia, supra note 7, at 76-77.
94. Id. at 77-78.
95. Id. at 79.
96. Id. at 79-80.
97. Behind the Blue Disk: Why Don’t You Pay Student-Athletes?, NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/Behind+the+Blue+Disk++Why+Dont+You+Pay+Student-Athletes.
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development in both sports and academics.98
To the
contention that the schools are generating revenue and can
easily afford to pay the student athletes, the NCAA responds
that more than ninety percent of NCAA schools consistently
lose money on their athletics programs and, in Division I, only
thirty percent of football and twenty six percent of men’s
basketball programs make money.99 Finally, in response to
the notion that student-athletes are being exploited, the
NCAA notes that most current and former student-athletes
appreciate the educational and athletic opportunities that
college presents, that student-athletes graduate at a higher
rate than the general student body, and that the average fullride scholarship at a public school is worth more than
$100,000, resulting in Division I and II institutions
cumulatively awarding $1.5 billion in athletics scholarships
each year.100
Professional Players Associations Should Take A More Active
Role in the Regulation of Agent Conduct
Players associations are in a unique position to regulate
agent conduct. Without players association certification,
agents
cannot
represent
the
member-athletes.101
Consequently, players associations hold significant leverage
to force agents to follow the players associations’ rules. The
main focuses of the players associations’ regulations are on
agents’ competence and ethics and on competition between
agents.102 Clearly, agents’ interactions with student-athletes
fall into the latter category. What has been seen as a positive
attribute of players associations, and the NFL Players
Association (“NFLPA”) in particular, is the willingness to
amend its regulations to better protect its members’
interests.103 This has been demonstrated in the past,104 as
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Davis, supra note 6, at 816.
102. Id. at 817-20.
103. Id. at 820-26.
104. In 2002, the NFLPA adopted a one-in-three rule, requiring agents to negotiate
at least one contract every three years to remain certified, in order to reduce the
number of agents in the market. Id. at 820. Also, in 2004, the NFLPA amended its
regulations to require agents to disclose all payments they make to runners. Id. at 820-
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well as the present, with the recent focus being on improper
Due to players associations’ unique
agent behavior.105
position of authority over agents and players associations’
willingness to amend their regulations when needed, some
individuals have called for players associations to take action
against agents who violate NCAA rules.106 This argument,
however, ignores the fact that players associations’ main
concerns are its members and that by entering into the
conflict between agents and the NCAA, players associations
may be acting in contravention of their members’ best
interests.
By suspending or, in an extreme case, banning an agent
from representing its members due to improper conduct,
players associations would be depriving members of their
chosen representation. Even if only one member of the
players association would be forced to find new
representation, this has historically been a major concern for
the players associations,107 making it unlikely to occur.
Further, former agent Luchs has stated that the NFLPA is
undermanned to police agent behavior.108 Luchs has called
the NFLPA’s regulations of agent conduct ineffective and
stated that the NFLPA only pursues cases that fall into its
lap.109 The lack of investigation and active pursuit of cases
against agents who violate NCAA rules has long been the
status quo and is not likely to change unless the NFLPA
would receive something significant in exchange for changing
its approach. Since the players associations’ main concern is
the welfare and happiness of its members and the agents’
conduct is not directly harming the student-athletes, and
future players association members, the players associations
may not be too motivated to take action to change the agents’
conduct. While student-athletes are unquestionably harmed
21.
105. NFLPA officials are part of a twenty-person panel considering solutions to the
problem of agents improperly interacting with student-athletes. Joe Schad, Financial
penalties for players possible, ESPN, Oct. 26, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=5725836.
106. See Pat Forde, Josh Luchs’ story only helps agent issue, ESPN, Oct. 13, 2010,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=forde_pat&id=5681728.
107. Davis, supra note 6, at 820-26.
108. Interview by Mike Golic & Mike Greenberg with Josh Luchs, former sports
agent, on ESPN Radio (Oct. 13, 2010).
109. Id.
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through NCAA penalties, student-athletes also benefit from
agents providing them with money and gifts. Thus, since the
number of players association members who received such
benefits without penalty is without question greater than
those who were caught by the NCAA,110 players associations
may view this type of agent behavior as having an overall
positive effect for its members and be hesitant to prevent it in
the future.
SCHOOLS THAT ARE HARMED BY AN AGENT’S CONDUCT SHOULD
BRING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST THE AGENT
All of the aforementioned solutions, aside from being
improbable, require further action by an entity as part of the
solution. But, these proffered solutions overlook the existence
of a more moderate solution, for which the framework is
already in place. Both statutes and the common law support
the option of schools bringing civil actions against agents who
cause them harm. Thus, there is no need for extensive
overhauls of NCAA rules or the existing statutes and there is
no further action needed by legislators or the NCAA before
schools can solve the problem of agent misconduct.
Statutory Civil Action
The UAAA authorizes a civil action for schools against
agents for damages caused by agent violations.111 The UAAA
states that schools have a right of action against either agents
or student-athletes who cause the school damages by violating
the UAAA.112 Under the UAAA, damages may include losses
schools suffer because of penalties from the NCAA or
conferences, or self-imposed penalties, as well as those
resulting from violations of the UAAA.113 As previously
110. As an example of the large number of student-athletes who received benefits
from agents without being caught, Josh Luchs claims to have paid at least thirty-three
current and former NFL players and was never discovered by the NCAA or any other
entity. Dohrmann, supra note 20. Luchs was only recently decertified by the NFLPA,
NFLPA decertifies Josh Luchs, ESPN, Oct. 21, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=5712065, demonstrating another instance of the NFLPA dealing with a case
that fell into its lap.
111. UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16.
112. Id. § 16(a).
113. Id. § 16(b).
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mentioned, these losses may include, “lost television
revenues, lost ticket sales from regular season athletic events,
lost revenues from not qualifying for postseason athletic
events such as football bowl games and NCAA tournaments,
and possibly the value of the athlete’s scholarship.”114 The
UAAA further states that rights of action do not accrue until
the school has, or reasonably should have, discovered the
violation and that liability in such a right of action is several,
not joint.115 Thus, by providing a right of action for any
damages caused by NCAA penalties and a wide range of
recoverable damages, the UAAA envisions civil actions by
schools as a major deterrent of improper agent conduct and,
possibly, as the overall solution.
Similarly, SPARTA provides schools with a right of action
for any damages caused by violations thereof.116 This is
significant due to the breadth of prohibited conduct under
SPARTA, which includes directly, or indirectly, recruiting or
soliciting a student-athlete to enter into a contract by giving
any false or misleading information or making a false promise
or representation.117 Further, an agent is prohibited from
providing anything of value to a student-athlete or person
associated with the student-athlete before entering into an
agency contract, including any consideration in the form of a
loan, or acting in the capacity of a guarantor or co-guarantor
for any debt.118 Finally, it is prohibited to enter into a
contract with a student-athlete without providing them with
the required disclosures,119 or to predate or postdate an
agency contract.120 If an agent engages in any of the
prohibited conduct under SPARTA or causes a school to be
penalized by the NCAA, a conference, or itself, resulting in
actual losses or expenses, then the school may recover those
damages under SPARTA.121 SPARTA also allows a school to
recover costs and reasonable attorney fees if it prevails in an

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Weiler, supra note 56, at 429.
UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT §§ 16(c), (d).
15 U.S.C. § 7805(b).
Id. § 7802(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 7802(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 7802(a)(2).
Id. § 7802(a)(3).
Id. § 7805(b)(2).
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action.122 This shows that Congress, as with the NCCUSL in
its drafting and promotion of the UAAA, intended to
encourage civil actions by schools as a primary means of
combating agent misconduct.
For those states that have not passed the UAAA, but have
athlete agent legislation on the books, there are similarities
with the UAAA and SPARTA. An example of this is the law
in California,123 which will be examined because of the
number of high profile universities in that state and the
recent NCAA rules violations at, and subsequent penalization
of, USC.124 The California law is known as the Miller-Ayala
Athlete Agents Act (“Miller-Ayala Act”),125 and is an excellent
example of an overly complicated statute, whose goals would
benefit from the simplicity and clarity of the UAAA. The
Miller-Ayala Act prohibits much the same behavior of the
UAAA and SPARTA including postdating contracts and
offering or providing money or other benefits to studentathletes.126 Also, the Miller-Ayala Act requires agents to
provide notice to the appropriate school when they enter into
a contract with a student-athlete and provides for language
that must be contained in every agent contract.127 The MillerAyala Act states that schools may bring a civil action for
recovery of damages from an agent if the school is adversely
affected by the acts of the agent or their representative.128
Schools are deemed adversely affected if they or one or more
of their student-athletes are suspended or disqualified from
competition by the NCAA or other regulatory entity.129 If a
school is deemed to be adversely affected, then its recoverable
damages include the greater of $50,000 or actual damages
and it may also recover punitive damages, court costs, and
reasonable attorneys fees. Additionally, violating agents
forfeit any right of repayment for benefits provided to
student-athletes and must refund any consideration paid by
122. 15 U.S.C. § 7805(b)(3).
123. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 18895-97.97 (2004).
124. See generally NCAA delivers postseason ban, ESPN, June 11, 2010,
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615.
125. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895.
126. Id. §§ 18897.5, 18897.6.
127. Id. §§ 18897.7, 18897.73.
128. Id. § 18897.8(a).
129. Id.
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the student-athlete or on behalf of the student-athlete.130
Agents also face criminal penalties of up to one year in jail, a
fine of up to $50,000, or both as well as the possible
suspension or revocation of their ability to engage in the
business of an athlete agent.131 Finally, in the Miller-Ayala
Act, the legislature stated its intent to encourage enforcement
of the Miller-Ayala Act through private civil actions.132 Thus,
as with Congress and the legislatures of the states that have
passed the UAAA, civil actions by schools against agents that
cause those schools damage are meant to be the primary
solution to the problem of improper agent conduct.
Common Law Civil Action
In addition to any statutory claims a school may bring
against an agent that has caused the school damage, schools
may also bring common law claims against such agents.
SPARTA and the UAAA expressly state that they do not
restrict the remedies under existing law or equity.133 Thus,
based on current statutory language and the precedent of
schools successfully bringing common law actions against
agents that cause schools harm,134 any school that has a
statutory civil right of action against an agent should also
pursue common law claims.
Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relation Claim
It is well established that a contractual relationship exists
between a school and its student-athletes.135 Thus, in a
situation where a student-athlete has breached its contract
with a school by entering into a contract with an agent and
losing NCAA eligibility, the school will have a claim for
tortious interference because, “one who intentionally and
improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
130. Id. § 18897.8(b).
131. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.93.
132. Id. § 18897.8(c).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 7806; UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16(e).
134. The claims in USC’s suit against Caron were interference with contractual
relationships and prospective business advantages. Almond, supra note 54.
135. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 16 N.C. App. 117 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972);
Williams v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 112 Ohio Misc. 2d 36 (Ohio Ct. Claims 2001);
Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 578 S.E.2d 711 (S.C. 2003).
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(except a contract to marry) between another and a third
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not
to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of
the third person to perform the contract.”136 The elements of a
claim for tortious interference with a contract are that the
conduct is intentional, the conduct interferes with the
contract, the defendant knew of the existence of the contract,
and the plaintiff suffered damages.137
The first three
elements are easily satisfied in any situation where an agent
signs a student-athlete to a contract, but the damages
element is more complex.
Aggrieved schools may recover the pecuniary loss of the
benefits of the contract.138
This includes television or
advertising revenue, loss of ticket sales, and other lost
income.139 Schools may also recover consequential damages
for losses that are caused by the interference.140 This may
include damages caused by NCAA penalties including
forfeiture of victories and tournament winnings.141
Significantly, schools are also permitted to recover for actual
harm to their reputation, as long as the harm was reasonably
foreseeable as a consequence of the interference.142 While
actual harm to reputation may be difficult to show, a
sympathetic court and jury may be willing to accept
arguments that this damage may not be discernible until
future dates. Lastly, and importantly, schools may recover
punitive damages under appropriate circumstances.143 Thus,
a school that brings a tortious interference with a contract
claim against an agent should be able to prove the required
elements with ease and may be able to recover considerable
damages, deterring agents from engaging in such conduct
with that school’s student-athletes in the future.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
137. Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1242.
138. RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A(1)(a).
139. Richard P. Woods & Michael R. Mills, Tortious Interference with an Athletic
Scholarship: A University’s Remedy for the Unscrupulous Sports Agent, 40 Ala. L. Rev.
141, 167 (1988-1989).
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A(1)(b).
141. Woods, supra note 139, at 169.
142. RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A(1)(c).
143. RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 774A cmt. a.
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Agent’s Liability to Third Parties Claim
Generally, an agent only owes duties to their principal,144
but in certain circumstances the duties owed by an agent
extend to third parties. In the context of representation
contracts between athletes and agents this would mean that
the only duties owed by the agent are to the athlete. But,
when the athlete in that situation is a student-athlete, the
duties owed by the agent may extend out to the studentathlete’s school, among others.
Since “an agent who
fraudulently makes representations, uses duress, or
knowingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud or
duress by his principal or by others is subject to liability in
tort to the injured person although the fraud or duress occurs
in a transaction on behalf of the principal,”145 one can
definitely make this argument.
By competing in athletic events for their school, a studentathlete who is no longer eligible for such competition, by
virtue of entering into a contract with an agent or receiving
benefits from an agent, is committing fraud on the school.146
So, the elements of this tort are easily established. The
student-athlete is the principal and the agent is, well, the
agent. The principal is committing a fraud by competing
when they are ineligible. The agent knows the principal will
be committing fraud and assists them in it by (1) making
them ineligible and (2) not notifying the school that the
student-athlete is no longer eligible. Therefore, schools
should bring claims against an agent that provides improper
benefits to a student-athlete or enters into a representation
contract with a student-athlete since that agent would likely
be found liable for fraud.
Viability of Civil Actions as the Solution to Agent Misconduct
Clearly, a school’s ability to pursue a civil action against
an agent that causes the school damage has been established
through statutes and the common law. But, the existence of
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13.
145. Id. § 348.
146. Fraud is intentional deception that causes a person or entity to give up
property or some lawful right. See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 555 (2d college
ed. 1984).
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such a right of action does not mean that it is automatically
the solution to preventing agents from engaging in improper
behavior. This section will consider whether civil action is a
viable solution to the problem by considering criticisms of it
and whether universities would actually pursue it as an
option.
Criticisms of Civil Actions as the Solution to Agent
Misconduct
One criticism of this solution asserts that universities
make too much money from college sports to undertake
publicized and damaging lawsuits.147 This criticism cites the
damaging information that may come out about the schools
during the discovery process and the belief that universities
want to keep NCAA violations out of the public eye.148 But,
this Comment does not contend that schools should sue
whenever there is an NCAA violation. Rather, schools should
sue when the NCAA violations and penalties are severe, such
as at USC where there is a two-year bowl ban and a threeyear reduction in scholarships.149 When violations like that
occur, they are already in the public eye and, since the NCAA
publicizes its findings in relation to the penalties it delivers,
there is not much that can come out in the discovery process
that would harm the school any further.
Another criticism of civil actions as the solution is that
some agents may be judgment-proof and the agents that
schools would succeed in bringing claims against are not
worth the expense of a lawsuit.150 This criticism comes from
the beliefs that some agents will not be deterred by the risk of
any possible fine or penalty because the reward of signing a
superstar athlete is much greater and that the agents that
would be deterred are not the ones that pose the greatest
threat to student-athletes and schools, so it is a waste of time
and resources to pursue claims against them.151 This criticism
is lacking in both its bases. First, it ignores the possibility of
how large a successful claim against an agent may be. If an
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1245-46.
Id. at 1246.
Zinser, supra note 3.
Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1246.
Id.
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agent is found fully liable for the damage a school suffers as a
result of NCAA penalties, the school’s recovery may be in the
tens of millions of dollars. As demonstrated above, damages a
school is entitled to recover under a statutory civil action
could include “lost television revenues, lost ticket sales from
regular season athletic events, lost revenues from not
qualifying for postseason athletic events such as football bowl
games and NCAA tournaments, and possibly the value of the
athlete’s scholarship.”152 If you add on to that amount the
damages a school is entitled to under the common law for
harm to reputation as well as punitive damages, the
monetary judgment could be astronomical. Second, even if a
particular agent does not possess enough assets to pay off an
adverse judgment, the deterrent effect of a large damages
award would not be lessened. Nevertheless, many of the
major agents have significant assets and recovery of a
judgment against those agents would be possible.
A third criticism of this solution is that bringing a civil
action would harm the school’s reputation.153 This would
make it harder to recruit student-athletes because it would be
a logical choice for a student to choose a school without a
propensity to sue people who cause NCAA violations.154
Further, it would dissuade alumni and others from donating
to the university if the school was being criticized in the
media.155 This criticism falters for several reasons. First, this
solution does not call for schools to sue student-athletes who
violate NCAA rules; it calls for action against those who
induce the student-athletes into breaking the rules. Thus, a
school choosing to pursue this solution will never harm a
student-athlete. Second, this solution envisions every school
that is harmed by agent misconduct bringing an action
against those agents. If a school does not want to pursue such
an action and chooses not to protect itself, then it does not
deserve the protection of the law. Finally, rather than
dissuade donors, this solution may persuade individuals to
donate more, or at all. If an alumnus sees that its school will
not stand by and let others harm it, then that alumnus may
152.
153.
154.
155.

Weiler, supra note 56, at 429.
Willenbacher, supra note 5, at 1246-47.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
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be willing to contribute more to help the school’s defense.
Further, such an action may bring the school community
together; pitting it against an opponent as if it were a football
game in November or a basketball game in March, creating a
surge of pride that would increase donations in both the
present and future.
A final criticism of civil actions as a solution is that schools
may be unable to bring successful claims because of their
knowledge of the violations.156 After all, the NCAA only
delivers most serious penalties when a lack of institutional
control on the part of the school is present along with the
violations.157 Paul Haagen, co-director of Duke University’s
Center for Sports Law and Policy, has said, “You're going to
have this question about whether the harm was caused by the
action or by the failure of the institution effectively to control
… There would be a contributory negligence kind of thing
there. That would be a difficulty.”158 While this criticism
would be valid if the solution of schools bringing civil actions
relied upon the recovery of full damages, it overlooks the fact
that it is unnecessary for a school to recover all of its damages
to be successful. Once a school has been hit with NCAA
penalties it has two choices: (1) take the penalty and suffer all
the damage, or (2) take the penalty and receive some relief
from the agent who caused the penalty. Even if a school’s
penalty would result in $10 million in damages and they
would only have a true recovery of one dollar from the
agent,159 they are still clearly better off financially. Further,
the suit would still accomplish the goal of sending a message
to agents that the school will not tolerate interference with its
student-athletes and deter agents from engaging in improper
conduct at that school in the future. Therefore, the civil
action would still be successful even if the school were unable
to recover the full amount of its damages.
Schools Would Consider Civil Actions as a Viable Option
There are only two ways to know if schools would consider
156. Id. at 1248.
157. Ken Tysiac, N.C. State’s Yow warns agents, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 6,
2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/06/616770/yow-warns-agents.html.
158. Id.
159. True recovery equaling the full amount of the award less all costs.
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civil actions against agents who cause the school harm as a
viable option: (1) schools have done it in the past, or (2)
schools have said they will do it in the future. There have
been instances of both of these possibilities. First, USC filed
a civil action against Caron when it suffered NCAA penalties
in 1995.160 This was one of the first instances of a school
pursuing an action against an agent and,161 while it has not
become a popular option, demonstrates that in the right
circumstances schools will pursue civil actions against agents.
Second, Debbie Yow (“Yow”), the athletic director at North
Carolina State University (“N.C. State”), has said that if
agents break any laws while recruiting N.C. State studentathletes, the university will take action against the agents.162
Yow has sent a letter to all registered agents in North
Carolina stating as much, something she also did when she
was the athletic director at the University of Maryland.163
Thus, while the opportunity to pursue a civil action against
an agent has not arisen for her, Yow has made it clear to the
agents in two states that improper conduct will not be
tolerated and that she is willing to pursue civil actions to
protect her university. Finally, Mike Garrett (“Garrett”),
former athletic director of USC, has stated his support for
civil actions against agents that interfere with studentathletes.164 Garrett has suggested that the NCAA institute a
tax on its members to fund mandatory civil actions against
such agents and stated that the benefits of this solution
include not only the recovery of damages, but also the access
to information the NCAA would gain through court
proceedings.165 Clearly, this demonstrates that civil actions
against agents that cause schools harm is a viable option for
schools to prevent agents from inducing their student-athletes
into breaking NCAA rules.

160. Almond, supra note 54.
161. Id.
162. Tysiac, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Mike Garrett, How to Keep Agents Off the Field, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/opinion/30garrett.html?_r=1.
165. Id.
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Other Parties that may have Causes of Actions Against Agents
In addition to the civil actions that schools may bring
against agents that cause the schools damage, there are other
parties that may also have claims against those agents, which
could serve as supplements to the civil actions brought by
schools. Outside of the obvious possibility of the studentathlete bringing an action against an agent,166 other parties
that may have claims include other student-athletes at the
school, coaches at the school, alumni and fans of the school,
and other sports agents. One possibility is for these parties to
bring a statutory action against the agent. While SPARTA
and the UAAA do not provide for actions by other parties,
instead focusing on actions by the schools,167 the Miller-Ayala
Act states that, in addition to athletes and schools, any other
person who is adversely affected by acts of an agent that are
in violation of the Miller-Ayala Act may bring a civil action to
recover their damages.168 Alternatively, if a person resides in
a state that does not have a statutory right of action, they
may bring a civil action under the common law, possibly
claiming that the agent breached a duty owed to them by
virtue of the agent’s actions creating the risk of harm.169 In
either scenario, such a case would likely turn on the ability of
the plaintiff to establish damages.
Other Student-Athletes’ Claims Against Agents
Other student-athletes at schools harmed by agents,
especially returning players on the team penalized by the
NCAA, are left to pay the price for the mistakes of their
166. Athletes are able to bring actions against their agents through both contract
and tort law, as with any other agency relationship. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT §
16 cmt. Usually, these actions arise in situations involving financial mistakes. See Liz
Mullen, Judge orders Jones to pay Dishman $550K, SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 3, 2002,
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/29021; Pippen wins $11 million lawsuit
against financial advisor, CBS BUS. NETWORK, Dec. 20, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m1355/is_25_106/ai_n8694084/. But, while possible, there has not been a
claim brought by an athlete against an agent on the basis of the agent’s actions causing
the athlete loss of NCAA eligibility.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 7805; UNIF. ATHLETE AGENT ACT § 16.
168. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.8(a).
169. An actor is negligent with respect to another if his conduct creates a
recognizable risk of harm to the other individually, or as a member of a class of persons.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 136, § 281 cmt. on Clause (b).
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former teammates and are harmed by the NCAA rules
violations of agents in various ways. First, if there is a
scholarship reduction, then there are fewer players on the
team. This increases the amount of playing and practice time
per player and makes players more susceptible to fatigue and
injuries, possibly reducing or ending players’ careers. This is
why USC did not have any contact in their preseason
practices in 2010.170 Second, if the school is prohibited from
playing in bowl games, then the players have less opportunity
to practice and play games to increase their experience and
skills and to showcase their talents in front of nationwide
audiences.171
Finally, if the school is hit with serious
penalties by the NCAA, such as a reduction in television time
or scholarships, it will likely make the team less successful,172
which would decrease the number of professional scouts at
the games and also prevent students from competing on
television, which further decreases their opportunity to be
discovered. Therefore, these student-athletes definitely suffer
damages as a result of an agent’s NCAA rules violations and,
if they are able to establish a concrete dollar amount, would
likely be able to recover against such an agent.
Coaches’ Claims Against Agents
Coaches are also harmed by the NCAA rules violations of
agents in a variety of ways. First, the coach may be fired
from his position at the school as a result of the NCAA

170. See Lane Kiffin: no more tackling, ESPN, Aug. 12, 2010, http://espn.go.com/
blog/los-angeles/usc/post/_/id/2705/lane-kiffin-no-more-tackling; Josh Jovanelly, Practice
isn’t the fix for USC’s tackling woes, DAILY TROJAN, Oct. 4, 2010, http://dailytrojan.com/
2010/10/04/practice-isn%E2%80%99t-the-fix-for-usc%E2%80%99s-tackling-woes/
(“Sanctions equal fewer players, which means a team that has less tolerance for injuries
that don’t happen on game day.”).
171. Some coaches place importance on qualifying for bowl games just for the
additional fifteen practices it permits, enabling the coaches to further develop their
players. See Erick Smith, Notre Dame coach Brian Kelly wants Irish in a bowl game,
any bowl game, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
campusrivalry/post/2010/10/notre-dame-coach-brian-kelly-wants-irish-in-a-bowl-gameany-bowl-game/1.
172. After receiving NCAA discipline similar to that given to USC, in the five years
after bowl bans were lifted Alabama’s record was 21-14, Auburn University’s record
was 18-22, and the University of Oklahoma’s record was 17-15-2. Rosenfield, supra
note 3.
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violations.173 Second, if the coach keeps his job, it will tarnish
his reputation, making it harder for him to attain
employment in the future and also to recruit student-athletes
at the present time.174 Finally, if the school is required to
decrease its scholarships, then it will make it much harder for
the coach to perform his job and will likely result in
unsuccessful seasons.175 This lack of success could also lead to
the coach’s firing and make it harder for them to attain
employment in the future. Thus, while it may be difficult to
quantify the amount of harm, it is inarguable that coaches are
harmed by the NCAA rules violations of agents.
Alumni and Fans’ Claims Against Agents
Alumni are harmed by the NCAA rules violations of
agents because such violations tarnish the name and
reputation of their school. This may decrease the value of
their education in the public’s eye and make it harder for
them to network or attain employment. Additionally, fans are
harmed by the NCAA rules violations of agents because if
those violations result in postseason or television bans, it will
present fans fewer opportunities to watch their school’s team.
Moreover, if the rules violation is severe and the NCAA
delivers it dreaded “death penalty,”176 it will deprive fans of
173. It is common for schools to include termination for cause provisions in their
coaches’ contracts, enabling them to terminate the coach’s employment if their program
is found guilty of a major NCAA rules violation. See Adam Rittenberg, RichRod gets
win, still needs more on field, ESPN, Nov. 4, 2010, http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/
post/_/id/19154/richrod-gets-win-still-needs-more-on-field.
174. Following the NCAA’s announcement of USC’s penalties, USC lost its
commitment from one of the top high school offensive linemen in the country. See AP:
Seantrel Henderson chooses to play for Miami, USA TODAY, July 13, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/acc/2010-07-09-hendersonmiami_N.htm.
175. See supra note 172.
176. “The ‘death penalty’ is a phrase used by media to describe the most serious
NCAA penalties possible. It is not a formal NCAA term. It applies only to repeat
violators and can include eliminating the involved sport for at least one year, the
elimination of athletics aid in that sport for two years and the school relinquishing its
Association voting privileges for a four-year period. A school is a repeat violator if a
second major violation occurs within five years of the start date of the penalty from the
first case. The cases do not have to be in the same sport.” Glossary of terms, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2010, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
NCAA/Issues/Enforcement/Rules+Enforcement+glossary+of+terms.
Southern
Methodist University is the only school to receive the full extent of the NCAA’s death
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any opportunity to watch their school’s team. Lastly, if the
fan is a season ticket holder, it may cause a diminution in
value to their investment, thus presenting a tangible,
financial harm. Consequently, claims by fans and alumni
against agents may have the best chance of success, especially
if they are ticket holders, because they are the easiest in
which to identify a quantifiable amount of damages.
Other Agents’ Claims Against Agents
Other agents are harmed by the NCAA rules violations of
agents because those violations create a negative public
perception of the entire sports agent industry.177 This may
make it harder for them to attract clients, especially at
schools that have already been harmed by agents.178 Further,
if they are part of the same firm or agency as an agent that
has violated NCAA rules, it may make it harder for them to
attract clients because they may be seen as unethical or
untrustworthy to potential clients, essentially as guilty by
association. Additionally, competing agents may be able to
bring a claim for unfair competition against agents that
violate NCAA rules. If an agent is losing out on clients
because they are following the rules while others are not, then
there is certainly tangible harm. But, despite the possibility
of easily establishing damages, agents are reluctant to bring
civil actions, or even file grievances with players associations,
against other agents.179
Thus, while agents could be
successful in actions against agents who violate NCAA rules,
the probability of such actions being initiated is not currently
penalty and its football team did not recover for over twenty years. See generally David
Williams, Overcoming the NCAA Death Penalty: Southern Methodist, 21 Years Later,
BLEACHER
REPORT,
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/16678-overcoming-the-ncaadeath-penalty-southern-methodist-21-years-later.
177. “Like serpents they infest the gardens and groves of American sport, poised to
strike at the wealth professional athletes earn in such plenty. This, anyway, is the
popular perception of sports agents, and it’s a generalization based on a great many
sordid and all-too-true particulars.” Craig Neff, Den of Vipers, A Sports Scourge: Bad
Agents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/
article/magazine/MAG1066585/index.htm.
178. For example, agents are no longer allowed to attend practices at USC following
the penalties the NCAA delivered. See Marcia C. Smith, New feeling at USC practice:
Keep out, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/
practice-260770-usc-field.html.
179. See Davis, supra note 6, at 805.
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high.
CONCLUSION
While there is near-universal consensus that something
needs to be done to dissuade agents from violating NCAA
rules and, consequently, causing damage to student-athletes
and schools, there is not even near a plurality opinion on
what that action should be. More regulation, elimination of
the NCAA’s amateurism requirement, and regulation by
players associations have all been proffered as options, but
they are either inherently flawed or impractical. The debate
about the way forward assumes that we have already
exhausted available options. That is simply not true. The
solution to the problem should utilize the existing statutory
and common law framework, making civil actions by schools
against agents that cause those schools damage the best
solution. In addition to allowing schools to recover some, if
not all, of their damages, civil actions will serve as a major
deterrent for improper agent conduct. If an agent knows that
they may be held liable for tens of millions of dollars, then the
risk will finally outweigh the reward of signing a superstar
athlete and it will no longer make economic sense for agents
to break NCAA rules to sign athletes. Moreover, this
deterrent does not disappear in cases where agents will not be
held liable for such large amounts. If a school brings a civil
action against an agent and that agent is found liable, then
even if the amount of damages awarded is minimal, such a
finding would likely lead to punishment from players
associations, resulting in the removal of the unscrupulous
agent from the marketplace.180 Therefore, civil actions by
schools against agents who cause those schools damage is
clearly the best solution because it provides relief to schools
for past harms by such agents and dissuades agents from
violating NCAA rules, at that school and others, in the future.
Lastly, these tools have the advantage of existing already;
they do not impose high costs for creation, development, or
180. The NFLPA decertified Luchs for admitting he violated NCAA rules to sign
athletes. See NFLPA decertifies Josh Luchs, supra note 110. Thus, since such an
admission leads to penalties from players associations, a finding by a court that an
agent violated NCAA rules and caused damage to student-athletes and schools would
also likely result in decertification or, at a minimum, suspension.
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